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Article 10

reliable ·in better than
percent of cases, the law
andoned the former criterion of
ing" and will now accept the
of the Aschheim-Zondek test.

"An infant, in the mother's womb, is
supposed in law to be born for many
purposes. It is capable of having a legacy , or
a surrender of a copyhold estate made to it;
and it is enabled to have an est ate limited to
its use, and to take afterwards by such
limitation, as if it were then actually
born." 3 ·
·

in his famous Com-

The Civil Law . of England clearly
held that, once a child was actually
born and could prove it was in
existence in the uterus at the time a
right would have been available to it,
then it would enjoy the right of being
considered in law a person from the
very moment of its conception. Lord
MacMillan, in 1935, in Elliot v. Joicey
concluded that a fetus in the womb
was to be regarded as a living person
with reference to all matters that
would be to its advantage but no other
person could derive a benefit from an
unborn child until it were actually
born. 4

Abortion- Part X
A Legal Review

, states: ·

. Rt.' Rev. Msgr. Paul V. Harrington, J.C.L. .

It will be interesting and important
to inquire what status the civil law , in
its development , has accorded to the
unborn fetus. In general, this will be
investigated with specific reference to
the rights accorded to the fetus under
· the common law, under the statutory
law of the individual states and by
reason of the interpretation of the law
by various . courts . in their judicial
decisions.
One must keep in mind that the law
and legal jurisprudence necessarily
depend upon the medical sciences for
the knowledge and information which
is required for . the determination and
verification of conception , the
beginning of human life , the nature ,
growth a nd · development of
intra-uterine life , the duration of
pregnancy , the problems and
complication s of pregnancy and the
entire process of delivery.
Obviously , the law can never be
ahead of medical research but must
always await the findings of science
and allow sufficient time for their
confirmation and proven worth. It will
take some period of time for the
experimental conclusions to be printed
in the text books and journals and to
be absorbed by the lawyers and jurists,
who ultimately will find the proper
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cases and circumstances to 1ply and
invoke the new data. A ve. obvious
example of this woul c.~ be the
determination of pregnan, . Before
the c~rtain , probable and r mmptive
signs of pregnancy were ' termined
relatively recently , the o· ,i certain
indication of a pregnane was the
actual movement of the c :d within
the· mother. This would m .Uy occur
about the fourth mon t!· and was
referred to as "quicke :1g" and
the mother was described !S "quick
with child." Since this w· the first
certain sign that a pregnaL f actually
was in progress, the 1w, with
reference to the unborn l us and its
rights , would only conside1 ·,uch rights
as dating from the fi:sign of
movement. Any refe n. ce to a
pregnancy possibly ex isl i1 g before
quickening was mere s~::;p i cion or
conjecture and was too te;~ u o us upon
which to recognize life , d te right t.o
life and other rights , whicl, have their
origin in true existence.

is the immediate gift of God, a right
by nature in every individual; and
in contemplation of the law as
as an infant stirs in the mother's
For if a woman is quick with child,
a potion, or otherwise , killeth it in
b; or if anyone ·beat her, whereby
dieth in her body, and she is
of a dead child ; this, though not
by the ancient law homicide or
iiiAIIIIJhtPr

"I

English common law, it was
thatfetus was not a
being, in the sense that the
ion of its life was true murder,
it was not a reasonable creature
that it did not have a life separate
independent of the mother but,
on the ancient Roman Law, it
that the fetus was part of the
of the mother.

a

Since the dis co very of the
Aschheim-Zondek test for the
determination of pregn ancy and since

declares: " The line must
be drawn either at the point
the foetus begins to live , or at a
at which it begins to have a life
t .of its mother's life , or at
where it has completely
into the world from its
body. It is almost equally
that the last of these three
is the one whiCh it is most
to choose .. . . The line has
been drawn at this point by the
England. " 2

• .
.
is
(Monsignor Har rz n g t o n f
0
Vice-0/ficialis for the A rchdiocese
Boston.)

reference to civil matters and
of the unborn child to hold
to property and to inherit a
' Blackstone says:
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In 1907, the House of Lords in
Gilbey stated that the
ordinary meaning of laws that refer to
"children" or "issue" would not
normally include the intrauterine fetus
but a departure from the strict
meaning would .be justified so that a
fictional construction might be given
. to them whereby an unborn child
mjght be considered as already born
for purposes of benefiting from a
right to which he would be entitled if
he were born. This fictional
construction was always predicated on
the fact of a subsequent live birth. 5

Villar v.

In the same year of 1907', the
English Court of Appeal in Williams v.
Ocean Coal Co . Ltd. held that the
fictional construction that had been
applied with reference to real property
in Villar v. Gilbey should be extended
to include personal property so that an
unborn child might be considered a

191

dependent under the Workers'
Compensation Act and receive a
benefit by reason of his father's death,
which had occurred prior to the fetus'
birth. 6 In 1909, The House of Lords
affirmed this inteipretation. 7
In 1909, the English Court of
Appeal, again considering the legal
status of an unborn child, declared
in Schofield v. Orrell Colliery Co.:
"Of course an unborn child is not born - it
is not an existing person in the ordinary
sense of the word. All our statutes are, of
course, framed in language suitable to ·the
case of existing persons, and thus the
peculiar fiction · of the law by which a
non-existent person is to be taken as
existing is not provided for in their
language; therefore you can always show
that the language of a statute does not fit
the case of the unborn. But that is not the
way to consider statutes when you . are
dealing with cases in which the law has gtven
the same rights to a non-existent child as to
an existing child. The true way of
interpreting the language of a sta~ te. in such
a case is to assume that the child IS born,
and then to draw deductions in the same
way as we should in the case of an existing
,8
person.

In the first decade of this century, it
was necessary to postulate this fiction
of law, if legal rights were to be vested
in and accrue to the fetus because
embryology had not as yet advanced
to the point where it could definitively
state that human life existed from the
very moment of conception, that the
entire process of pregnancy was a
continuous growth and development
of this same human life, that the fetus
was an entirely independent entity,
dependent upon the mother only for
circulatory and nutritional needs, that
birth was merely one more milestone
along the road of this development,
whereby the human child could now
exist completely separate from the
mother and that the process of life,
which began at conception, continues
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uninterruptedly through i n mterine
of the mother but that this
gestation, .the period of birth :nfancy,
IIUlJii)JUJ..u.ty could not be extended
childhood, adolescence young
unborn, unseen child, who had
adulthood and is completed . uy after
no ticket · and who did not
twenty-five years of 1' " This
exist as far as the Railroad was
important knowledge and d a would
d because they were not
not become available until e fourth li.1llfo1rme:d in advance that the passenger
and fifth decades on this c,. tury. At
pregnant and they could not
that time, the mere fictic of law ~ ~-mably be expected to presume or
could be abandoned becau the law
this contingency. 9
could now vest rights in th1. d us as it
vests rights in other persom · .: cause its
This decision has been criticized not
truly human life, existing ·rom the
for its failure .to consider the
very moment of concepti< , enables
of Tort but also because of the
narrow, limited and constricted
the fetus to be conside re ~ a human
of contractual liability . 1 0 The
person.
of whether or not the
Iri 1891, an Irish Cour . ~1e ard the
sustained injury by reason of
petition of a female infm· who was
defendant's negligence - the
seeking recovery for injuri,· which she
issue - was riever studied or
had sustained, while · s1 i in her
The remarks of Justice
mother's womb, by reaso1 df being a
are worthy of note as a
passenger with her mothe; · m a trai~
·of legalism; which
that was involved in a co · ·.·ion. Thts
tes on the narrow and
accident and the ensu · 3 injuries
view and entirely ignores the
caused her to be born 1 rmanently
implications:
injured, crippled and defor ed.
It was the claim of thE :nfant that
her mother was quick witl" child at the
time that she boarded a ·rain of the
Great Northern Railroad of Ireland,
that the mother purcha!->.: 1 a ticket,
that the train was h ~t .. dled in a
negligent manner, thus lnaking ~he
railroad liable for the iP ; uries whtch
she sustained and for wh ic;• she should
be allowed to recover.

The Irish Justices, whv decided this
case, considered me rely the
. 1'1cat lO
. ll:-.
,- and thef
con tractua1 1mp
liability of the Railroad by reason
contractual obliga ti o ns; t~ey
.
d · •TortiOus
complete!~ I~nore
~He
onlY
action, which m fact , was the ·cf
action presented by the infant plantt
The Judges declared that, by reas;~d
the purchase of a ticket , the Ra afe
assumed responsibility for the s

°
i
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llw, in reason, in the common language
in the bond of physical union,
instinct of duty ·and solicitude,
the continuance of the world
woman is the common carrier of
child, and not a railway

.- u..uu,

English jurisprudence
not merely the rights of a
to sue after its birth for injuries
while it . was still in its
womb, since it was truly a
person at that time, but it also
the right of a fetus to sue
injuries even before it was
As definitely favoring such a
Justice Buller arguing against the
of a fetus, stated:
see what this nonentity can do. He
vouched in a recovery, though it is
PDrpose of making him answer over
He may even be an executor. He

may take under the Statutes of
Distributions. He may take by devise. He
may be entitled under a charge for raising
portions. He may ,have an injunction, and he
may have a guardian. Some other cases put
this beyond all doubt. In Wallis v. Hodson,
Lord Harwick says, 'The principle I go upon
in the questio11 is, that the plaintiff was en
ventre sa mere at the time of her brother's .
death, and consequently a person in rerum
natura, so that, by the rules of the common
and civil law, she was to all intents and
purposes a child as if born in the father's
lifetime.' In the same case Lord Hardwick
takes notice that the civil law confines the
rules to cases where it is for the benefit .of
the child to be considered as born , but
notwithstanding he states the rule to be that
such child is considered living to all intents
and purposes . . . . . Why should not
children en ventre sa mere be considered
generally as in existence? They are entitled
to all the privileges of other persons. " 11

Many cases in the English and
Australian Courts, centered on the
right of a fetus to petition, even before
its birth, for injuries sustained during
its intra-uterine life, were decided on
the principle that the suit might be
instituted before birth but final
adjudication of the claim could not be
made until after the child had been
safely born. 1 2
Justice Martin in Manns v. Carlon,
decided in 1940, shows the reticence
of the Courts in Australia to enter a
final judgment before the actual birth
of the child:
"It seems that what authority there is, is in
favour of the view that a child en ventre sa
mere has a right of acti<:ln, but whether that
right is a vested right which enables a claim
to be made on its .befalf before birth or only
becomes vested when it is born alive is a
· difficult question on which I do not intend
to express an opinion, as, in any event, I
consider a stay should be granted. But in
any event the balance of convenience seems
to be in favour of granting a stay of the trial
until the birth of the child or further order
and, if the child be stillborn, I grant liberty
to the defendants to apply to strike out of
the statement of claim all reference to
it. " 1 3
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B. American Law and Jurisprudence
There has been a tradition in the
American Law and jurisprudence with
respect to the status .and rights of a
fetus and there has been a growth and
development in this area of the law in
recent years , which has corresponded
to medical research and new medical
findings and discoveries.
The rights of the · fetus might be
ascertained readily and conveniently if
we were to investigate separately and
individually each category of the law
that might have particular and specific
reference to an unborn child. Thus, we
shall proceed by considering the right
of the fetus: to sue for injuries
sustained during intrauterine life, to
receive support , to inherit , to recover
under Workmen's Compensation, to
have a guardian appointed and. to sue
in his own name by the intervention of
a guardian, to be born and to live ;
finally , we shall study the
constitutional personality of the fetus
or the rights of a fetus under a State
Constitution.

1. The Right of the Fetus to Sue for
Pre-Natal Injuries
In 1879, an Iowa court held that a
father could not recover for injuries
sustained by a fetus who had been the ·
victim of a miscarriage.
In 1880, a suit was entered against
the Town of Danville , Vermont, for
indemnification for injuries sustained
by an unborn, who subsequently died.
This was one of the earlier cases of this
type and set a pattern and a precedent
for deciding similar cases for many
years in the future. In this case , the
Court ruled that the mother could not
recover for the grief and sorrow she
experienced by reason of the death of
her unborn child. Grief was too
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nebulous, personal and a'
concept to warrant concre t<
and definite compensat ·
decision states:
"Any injured feelings fo:
miscarriage, not part of the p ,
attending it, ~e too rerr
considered an element of da:
plaintiff lamented the loss of l·
such grief involves too much ~~
sentiment to be left to the C1
caprice of a jury. If like Rae'
for her children and wo
comforted, a question of con t,
is presented, too delicate to 1·
any scales which the
5
invented. " 1

by her, we think it clear that the
sued upon does not embrace the
tiff's intestate within its

'1. .

wing the
naturally
e to be
:ge. If the
offspring,
d ement of
!ecture and
·, she wept
i not be
ing damage
Neighed by
has yet

A more celebrated, bf· :r known
and often quoted case is :~ Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Nort/ · npton of
1884. In this suit , the m•. 1er alleged
that, because of a del ·-t in the
negligent
highway, resulting fro '
maintenance , she slipped . d fell and,
pregnant,
being gaur or five mom
the fetus was born preJ mrely and
lived only . ten or fift 1 minutes.
1)lmes, the
Justice Oliver Wendell
ne
Court of
Chief Justice of the SupJ
1e
opinion.
Massachusetts, rendered

He stated:
"But no case, so far as we rww, has evei
decided that if the infant S' .vived, it could
maintain an ~ction for injuri' received by it
while in its mother's w .. ,b . . . .. If we
should assume, irrespectiw uf prece~en~
that a man might owe a civi; duty and mcui
a conditional ~rospe.ctive li<'·:··i~ty in ·tort t~
one not yet m · bemg, an l1 tf we shoul
assume also that causing r. infant to ~
born prematurely stands on the same
footing as wounding or poisoning, .we
should then be confronted ':;y the qu~stJ~
rai~ed by the .defendant, vhe t?er an mf=d
dymg before tt was able to live separa
from its mother could be said to have
become a person recognized by the laW as
01
capable of having a locus standi in court,
of being represented there by~
administrator. . . . . As the un~orn ~ tbe
was a part of the mother at the ttme 0
injury , any damage to it which was not:
remote to be recovered for at all
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one and studying only the second, he
drew a false conclusion.

16

Justice Holmes denied the right of
ry because he felt the unborn
' being a part of the mother and
separate, distinct and independent
her, had no personal existence
the law could recognize and,
, there was no precedent which
allowed for recovery for pre-natal
or for wrongful death.
One might question the statement
lack of precedent because Justice
s could have considered the
•cutratic·m of Justice Buller ( cf. supra)
Thellusson v. Woodford to the
that a fetus was not a legal
has some interesting
to make on Holmes'
Holmes assumed from the lack of
that the common law forbade
suit, and at least one judge has
the Dietrich case on the specific
that Justice Holmes knew the
law better than he did
mrltlrn~>.'.u;""., v. Gorsuch (1951), 197 Md.
It ts significant, however, that no case
ever denied recovery for prenatal
and it has been said that there was
law on the point until Justice
said there was. If this is so the
law denial of recovery was ndt the
for t~e decision but the result of

,

notes that "Holmes' fiat is
of the authority of the
and that his opinion "bristled
~icta and an inexplicable
1
The error was that the
in considering the analogy
the criminal law statutes
an attack upon the unbor~
an action of tort, failed to
two statutes and read them
and thus, by neglecting the

In any event, Holmes' opinion
prevailed and was quoted as the law
and authority from 1884 until 1946.
In addition to · the fact that an
unborn child was not considered as a
separate and distinct entity from the
mother and thus could not be granted
le~al recognition or given legal
extstence , there was added another
complicating factor to the right of
recovery for injuries sustained in the
prenatal stage and this was the
question _of proving the cause of the
injuries and their effect , if any , upon
the subsequent birth or death of the
fetus and the condition of the fetus at
birth. In the Walker v. Great Northern
Railroad of Ireland of 1891 (cf.
supra) , Justice O'Brien raised this
question of proof:
'There are instances in the law where rules
of right are founded upon the inherent and
inevitable difficulty or impossibility of
proof. And it is easy to see on what a
boundless sea of speculation in evidence this
new idea (to allow an action for prenatal
injuries) would launch us. What a field
would be opened to extravagance of
te~timony, already , great enough if
SClence could carry her lamp .. . .into the
unseen laboratory · of nature - could profess
t~ reveal the causes and things that are
htdden there - could trace a hair-lip · to
nervous shock, or a bunch of grapes on the
face to the fright - could, in fact, make
lusus naturae the same thing as lusus
scientae. There may be a question of
evidence . . . . but the · Jaw may see such
danger in that evidence, may have such a
. suspicion of human ignorance and
presumption , that it will not allow any
question of evidence to be entered into at
all."t 9

This opinion of Justice O'Brien had
great weight and evidence in
subsequent decisions in American
courts, where the right to recover was
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denied bec~use of the difficulty in
proving cause · and effect relationship
between the prenatal injuries and
survival and death, on the one hand,
and condition ~t birth, on the other
hand.
In Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Jordan (1935 ), the plaintiff alleged
that she was involved in an automobile
accident by reason of the defendant's
negligence and , as. a result, her twins
were born prematurely and on of them
was bruised and died nineteen days
after birth. The court quoted from
Justice 0 'Brien, approved his
conclusions arid declare.d that many
fictitious claims would be entered if
recovery were allowed. The decision
stated:
"The law gives to paients no cause of action
for the loss of a child which dies as · a
proximate result of injuries while it is still
quick in the womb of its mother, even
though such injuries may be inflicted by the
20
negligence of the defendant. "

This 1935 decision , which was the
precedent for all Texas deCisions for
the ensuing thirty years, was set aside
by the Texas Supreme Court only in
November, 1967. In this most recent ·
case , Mrs . Leal sued the C. C. Pitts
Sand and Gravel Company for
$50,000 , complaining that her infant
was born two or three months
prematurely and died within two days
and the premature birth was caused by
an accident between her family car
and the sand truck, which was driven
in a negligent manner. The District
Court and the Court of Civil Appeals
denied any recovery to the plaintiff,
but the Texas Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Associate Justice
Zollie Steakley, recognized that the
unborn infant had life and rights,
separate from the mother, and granted
compensation to the mother. 2 1
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All the criteria and pr
denying recovery, are set for t.
opinion of Justice Ronan in
v. Passanesi case, argued bet
Supreme Court of Massach1
1950:
.

.ciples,
in the
·e Bliss
re the
.!· tts in

"A review of aJ1thcsc subsequent lecisions
denying relief for prenata: injuries
demonstrates that they were base( 1pon the
grounds that there was lack of ccedent,
that there was due regard for th principle
of staie decisis, that the unborn · ild was a
part of the mother, that any cav l relation
between the prenatal injury anc' he death
or condition of the child wou ' rest on
~1d that
speculation and conjecture,
recognition of any cause of acti , in favor
of the child or its estate would 1e rise to
fictitious claims."

In considering the
guments
adduced fm the right . of ecovery,
Justice Ronan continues:
"We readily concede the strent
grounds, but there is also strf
arguments to the contrary, in
based upon the practical e
2
reliable proof. " 2

:1 of these
'1h in the
·~ding that
ficulty of

Chronologically , after t} Dietrich
decision, the next importan : ..: ase to be
considered is the Allaire v. '7 t. Luke's
Hospital. The interesting as..)ect of this
case is not the majority opin on, wruch
reechoed the Holmes' d :tum but
rather the prop h rc i c and
future-looking dissenting ;;pinion of
Justice Boggs.
The plaintiff in this cas;: is a male
infant, Thomas- E. Allaire, who sued,
through his mother and· ai torney, St.
Luke's Hospital in Chicago. Ulinois. H_e
claims that on February 2. 1896, his
· ·t I
mother was a patient at said hospt a
· to
for purposes of a confinement pnor
his birth, which was imminent. At th.e
direction of hospital attendants, his
mother was being transported via an
open elevator from the second floor to
00
the obstetrical suite. She was seated
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in the elevator and, as the
ascended, the left side of her
became entangled on some
projecting out from the wall of
shaft. The iinpact threw the
to the floor of the elevator
as a result, she was "greatly cut,
bruised and the bones
broken and said mother
and grievously bruised, hurt,
-..u....... and wounded in her left hip,
and body and other

plaintiff was born on February
1_896, and alleges that, by reason of
accident in whiCh his mother was
and the injuries sustained by
he Was born injured and
~c,rmc:~d. "His left foot, left limb, left
and left hand were and became
fiitherto have been and still are
withered· and atrophied and
said foot smaller than natural by
than one-half and made thereby
turn inward and the sole thereof
and his said limb shorter than
by more than four inches and
hip, side and arm by reason of
negligence and injuries became
are made shrunken, atrophied and
and his said limb without
thereon and from thence hitherto
so been and still are, and said
thereby greatly and sadly
for life."
the hearings before the trial and
courts, the verdict favored
hospital. The infant then sued
the Supreme · Court of Illinois
the decision was rendered by a
opinion, which was adverse to
Plaintiff. This Tribunal agreed
with and affirmed the
of the appellate court, which
the findings of the Dietrich
Walker cases. The majority
favored the position that the

pe;

unborn child, while in its mother's
womb, is a part of the mother and not
separate and distinct from her and
becomes independent only when
severed at birth; that the fetus was not
in legal existence at the time of the
accident; . that the mJuries were
sustained by the mother and were
recoverable only by her; that neither
statutory law nor the common law
· recognized the right of an infant to sue
for prenatal injuries; that, if tradition
and precedent is ' to be changed and
new rights are to be accorded, this
must be accomplished by the
legislature and not by the courts; that
an unborn child is recognized as the
subject · of rights not by factual
existence but by a legal fiction.
Justice Boggs, in his dissent, agreed
that there was no precedent, by
adjudicated case, for allowing a child,
once born, to sue for injuries-sustained
in his mother's womb but adde.d:
"Ap adjudicated case is not indispensable to
establish a right to recover under the rules
of the common law. Lord Mansfield
declaied: 'the law of England would be an
absurd science were it founded upon
precedents only. Precedents were to
illustrate principles, and to give them a fixed
certainty'."

Boggs continues:
"At the common law, actions were
maintainable to recover damages occasioned
by injuries to the person or the plaintiff,
whether inflicted intentionally or through
the negligence of the defendant. The
governing principle illustrated by such cases
is that the common law by way of damages,
gave redress for personal injuries inflicted by
the wrong or neglect of another. The case
disclosed by the declaiation under
consideration is embraced within the limits
of the principle thus recognized and it is
clear recovery coul<J have been maintained
at common law unless the fact the plaintiff
was unborn when the alleged injuries were
inflicted would have operated to deny a
right of action."
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Justice Boggs demonstrated an
awareness of ·the true life and human
existence of a fetus when he stated:
••Medical science and skill and experience
have demonstrated that at a period of
gestation in advan·ce of the period of
parturition the foetus is capable of
independent and separate life and that,
though within the body of the mother, it is
' not merely a part of her body, for her body
may die in all of its parts and child remain
alive and capable of maintaining life, when
separated from the dead body of the
mother. If at that period a child so advanced
is injured in its limbs or members, and is
born into the living world suffering from the
effects of the injury, is it not sacrificing
truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to
say the injury was not to the child, but
wholly to the mother?"

the medical learning of the age, ei· lowed it
with such . vitality and vigor,
td with
members and faculties so far con, Iete and
mature, that it could have r1 intained
independent life, and the deat· of the
mother would not have deprived i ' •f life. It
is but natural justice that such ar nfant, if
born alive, should be allowed to n •, n tain an
action in the courts for injuries ~ wrongly
committed upon its person whil ,o in the
womb of the mother."

Justice Boggs declared
~ at the
precedent of the Dietrich c e could
not apply to the present ituation
because in that case, ·the fe tt was not
viable but in this controv( ·\y· "the
child had reached that stage Jf foetal
life when it was capable of mtinued
existence independent of tt: mother;
that its person was injured w 1in itself
••A child in ventre sa mere was regarded at
and it was afterwards born 'ive, and
the common law as in. esse from the time of
conception for the purpose of taking any
with sufficient strength · and maturity
estate, whether by descent or devise, or
to maintain independent dstence,
under the statute of distribution, if the
and
still lives"; and that the de of the
infant was born alive after such a period of
Walker case was not. applic< .Je to the
foetal existence that its continuance if life
instant litigation because , ir hat case,
was or · might be reasonably
expected. . . . . If, in the contemplation of
the Railroad did not knov 1he fetus
the common law, life begins as soon as the
was in existence because tl . pregnant
infant is able to stir in the mother's womb,
condition of the mother was not
and that an injury inflicted upon an infant
known
but, in the present :;ase, the
while in the womb of the mother shall be
deemed 'murder if the infant survive the
hospital knew the mother . 'as gravid
wound during prenatal life, but succumbs to
and received her_ for ti express
it, and dies from it after being born, and if
purpose of delivering her i.:1by; also,
every legitimate infant in ventre sa mere is ·
the Railroad may not h •. -.'e had a
to be deemed as born for all purposes
beneficial to the child, why should it be
liability towards the un: .Jm child
supposed the common law would have
because no contractual !'. iationshjp
denied to an infant born alive the right to
had been initiated by the p:.,;chase of a
recover damages for the injury inflicted
ticket but, in the current , -1se at bar,
upon it while in the womb of the mother?
Had such injur-y, though inflicted· on the
the hospital assumed the responsibilitY
child while in the mother's womb, been
to care for mother and chilo in view of
sufficient to cause the death of the infant
the compensatio-n it received.

after it had been born alive, the common
law would have regarded the injury as
having been inflicted upon a human being,
and punished the perpetrator accordingly;
and, that being true, why shoud the infant
which survives be denied the right to recover
damages occasioned by the same injury? In
the case at bar the infant, when the injury
was inflicted, had, as the declaration alleged,
reached that advanced stage of foetal life
which would have, according to the
experience of mankind, and according to
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Justice Boggs concludes:
"If, in delivering a child, an attending
physician, acting for a compensation, s?~uld
wantonly or by actionable negligence mJUit
the limbs of the infant, and thereby cause
the child, although born alive and living, to
be maimed and crippled in bodY or
members, it would be abhorrent to eve~
impulse of justice or reason to deny to sue

Linacre QuarterlY

a right of action against such
to recover damages for the wrongs
inflicted by such physician. The
owed it as a duty to
though unborn, to bestow due
~~~r.ttin""-' care and skill to the matter of
!ln:servatiion and safety before and at the
his birth. . . . .. Should
IJeJlsat:ion for his injuries be denied on a
--:- known to be false - that the
was not to his person, but to the
of his mother? The law should, it
to me, be that whenever a child in
is so far advanced in prenatal age as
should parturition by natural or
means occur at such age, such child
would live separable from the
and grow into the ordinary
of life, and is afterwards born, and
a living human · being, such child
~f action for any injuries
or negligently inflicted upon his
person at such age of viabilitv
then in the womb of the mother."t3'

opinion of Justice Boggs, while
in ·the Allaire case, is
an important and
one, because it is the first
opinion in American
IJIU(lenc::e, which held that a living,
fetus, while in the uterus, is an
nt person with human life
rights including the right t~
action to recover damages for
wantonly and negligently
and that natural justice and
dictate there must be a legal
for wrongs suffered. The
opinion is also a landmark and a
stone in jurisprudential
'inasmuch as it laid the
and groundwork for future
, which would allow recovery.
--····· ·vu ...
· '""

Boggs ration~le . prevailed in
cases 24 , while the Holmes'
tri~mphed in most cases until
2S

court indica ted
right to sue and recover
be denied for reasons of
and public policy. 2 6 In

the same year, the Supreme Court of
Canada declared that the injured child
if he is born alive and if he continue~
to live, must bear the results of his
injury throughout life and, therefore,
he should have the right in justice to
recover damages for his infirmity. 2 7
In 1942, Chief Justice Brog-an, in a
dissenting opinion, inquired why the
courts felt bound to follow the .
precedent, denying personality to an
unborn fetus in tortious actions, when
in other fields of the law, such a · one
was recognized as an individual person ·
when it was to its benefit. 2 8
The general reasons for continuing
the denial of the right of the unborn
to sue were: the lack of legal
precedent, the inability of medical
science, at that time, to determine the
viability of the fetus and to prove
conclusively a casual relationship
between the negligent act and the
injuries sustained and, finally, because
of the danger of fictitious claims.
In Damasiewicz v.. Gorsuch two
important principles were set 'forth:
that one must draw a distinction
between the right to bring a suit and
the ability to prove one's allegations
conclusively; that the courts have
al~a~s been ~ngaged in differentiating
legitimate chums .from false claims. 2 9
An Illinois court suggested that if
justice requires that every · wrong 'be
righted by the law, the legislature
s,4<;>uld set forth by statute the right of
the unborn to sue; this should. not be
declared by the courts. 3 0 An Ohio
court denied this assertion: "No
legislative action is required to
authorize _recovery for personal
injuries caused by the negligence of
another. Such right was one existing at
common law" 3 1
,
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seems to me to be a contradictic
One final objection was raised to the
True, it is in the womb, but i t
right to sue f~r prenatal injuries and
now of extra-uterine life that was the danger that , if the right . dependent for its continued devc
were granted and recognized , a child ,
sustenance . . . . it is not a ' r
mother in the sense of .a
when born, could sue his mother for
element. . ... Indeed apart from
any ·negligence that might be
non-viable fetus · is not a p·
34
attributable to her. 3 2
mother. "
.

· in tenns.
"> capable
,1d while
.mstituent
iability,a
t of the

Th~ first significant change from the
Dietrich rule came in a decision of the
Federal Court of the District of
Columbia in 1946 iri the Bonbrest v.
Kotz litigation .33 This was a
malpractice suit in which the physician
was charged with professional
negligence during the delivery , which
resulted in injuries to the child. Th~
causal relationship between the modus
operandi of the doctor and the
sustaining of injuries by the child was
clearly proved , so that there was no
danger of a fictitious claim. The
decision remarked: "The law · is
presumed to keep . pace with the
sciences and medical science certainly
has made progress since 1884 (when
the Holmes' opinion was rendered)" .

It is important to note th
vests rights only in person
real and in actual existeJ
fiction of law; either p }'sica] or
moral. In the early commc ' law, and
unborn had rights, by a fie! .m of law,
- as if they were exis' :1g - in
property and under ',.Us. ~he
embryological knowledge c · the tune
would not allow for a docl . ·ne of real,
human, physical existent
unborn fetus as a separate, ·
independent person. Un<J·
.
rule the unborn fetus was ·;ons1dered
as p;rt of the mother and, ., :· creby: the
mother was the person w!· · sustamed
the injuries and she was he per~n
who recovered damages. h d ice Bo~s
in Allaire was convince ', that the
unborn fetus was an i· dependent
The important contribution of the
person,
who should be rc ·ognized as
Bonbrest case is the recognition that a
having
the
right, when bon ·. to ~ue. for
viable fetus has the right to· sue for
prenatal
injuries
but his convictions
injuries which were inflicted in the
were not followed. In Bunbrest, the
latter stages of its prenatal existence
viable fetus was considerec< by the law
because the viable fetus is an
to be an independent enti y in wh~rn
independent entity and separate , in its
legal
rights could be vested - includmg
existence , from the mother. This is ·
the right to bring an a{·:lon. Later,
emphasized in the sentence of the
other courts were to w nsider 3
court:
non-viable fetu~ as an indivi~ual
"Judicial opm10n . . . . has held
person, who could bring a tort actiOn.
that ... . prenatal injury offered no basis
The conclusion. is import;m t: the l~
for an action in tort in favor of the child or
vests
rights only in persons and if t e
its personal representative. ~his conclusi?n
law grants rights to a non-viable fetus,
is predicated on the assumption that a child
en ventre sa mere .... is so intimately
the law recognizes such as a person.
united with its mother as to be a "part" of
her and as a result is not to be regarded as a
separate and distinct and individual entity.
This rather anomalous doctrine was
announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton. . ... As to a viable child '
being a 'part' of its mother - this argument
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So deeply entrenched m Amen .
jurisprudence was the . H~lmes' ru~~
and the Die tric~ fmdmg that ntil
remained the law m many. states uthe
the 1960's. From the ume of he
Bonbrest decision in 1946 up to t

there were simultaneous,
legal positions: some
ions were still denying a tort
; some states were granting the
to s~e provided that the fetus
viable at the time of the injury
was subsequently born alive ; other
were according the right to a
who was actually non-viable at
time the trauma was experienced,
providing that there was a live
a third group of states was
holding that the right to bring
was recognized even if the
was stillborn.
lllfltne~o1ra

was the first state to have
of last appeal grant to a child
right to recover damages for
sustained in its prenatal life
it had become viable and this was
35
•
From.J946 untill967 ,
states have accorded the
to sue to a child who was a viable
at the time of injury and was
ssed with live birth. 3 6

1953, Illinois, in two separate
reversed the 1900 decision of
and finally adopted the
of Justice Boggs as set forth
dissent!ng opinion. 3 7
this twenty-one year period,
, in earlier decisions
the Holmes' rule and reversed
in later decisions and
recognized the right to
:~~lSSClchusetts provides such an

1950, in Bliss v. Passanesi, Justice
, noting that a precedent was
established which was contrary
Dietrich find i ng, and
the validity of their
, maintained that :
this

case not only established the
Commonwealth since its

:~ .:.>·~~ :.( ;\:/'·r~r
rendition more than sixty years ago but it is
still supported by the great weight of
authority in other jurisdictions. We are not
inclined to overrule the Dietrich case." 3 8

In 1952, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts decided the Cavanaugh
v. First National Stores, Inc. case. A
child brought an action by his next
friend alleging that on December 25 ,
1945 "he was a living entity , existing
as a developing child, quick with life
and viable in the womb of his
mother .. . . who then was pregnant
with him for six months ; that his
mother purchased and ate unfit turkey
supplied by the defendant ; that as a
result she became sick and was caused
next day to have a premature
childbirth ; and that the plaintiff was
born blind .... otherwise not fully,
normally and naturally developed."
After considering the rulings of recent
years " allowing recovery by a child for
prenatal injury .... we are not
prepared to overrule · our · earlier
decisions, which began nearly seventy
years ago." 3 9
An action was brought by Zelia
Keyes as administratrix of the estate
of Duncan Reed against the
Construction Service Inc. alleging
"that while her .interstate was an
existing viable child in his mother' s
womb , he received bodily injury in a
collision of automobiles, causing him
to be borm prematurely , and which
said bodily injuries resulted in his '
death." The Supreme Court , while not
actually deciding the case because the
actual live birth of the child was not
clearly proved, did return the ca~e to
the trial court for the verification of
this fact , thereby indicating that the
right to sue and to recover would be
recognized once all the facts , required
by law , are established.
The Supreme Court in its decision in
1960 stated:
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"We are asked to reexamine previous
decisions of this court and again decide
whether a child or his legal representative
may recover in an action of tort for prenatal
injuries caused by the negligence of a third
party who was not the child's mother."

Some quotations from this ruling
should be pointed out and ca,refully
considered:
"Reasons generally advanced for recognizing
a child's right of action' for prenatal injuries
are: Natural justice· demands recognition of
a legal right of a child to begin life
unimpaired by physical or mental defects
resulting from the injury caused by the
negligence of another. A manifest wrong
should not go without redress. Since the law
protects an unborn child in the descent and
devolution of property whenever it would
be for the benefit of the child and in the
enforcement of criminal law, the unborn
child is regarded as a legal entity; therefore
by analogy the law should recogn~~ the
right of an unborn child not to be mjured
tortiously by another. . . : . No new reason
has been advanced in recent years for
allowing recovery other than the growing
body of precedent in favor of it and the
progress made in medical
science . . . .. This substantially is now held
to be the law by a majority of the State
Appellate Courts and by the District Court
of the United States for the District of
Columbia. . . . . We have held that when a
debatable question has been considered and
definitely decided in a reasonable manner it
is usually the part of wisdom, in the absence
of important new considerations, to adhere
to the decision made. Although this
doctrine is salutary it may be more
important in a given case that th~ co~rt be
. right, in the light of later exammatton of
authorities, wide and more thorough
discussion and reflection upon the policy of
the law, than that it adhere to previous
decisions. We think it advisable that in
respect to the subject of prenatal injury t~e
law of this Commonwealth should be m
general in harmony with that of the large
and growing proportion of the other States
which have adopted in principle the rule
,40
proposed by Ju dge B oggs.

Missouri, Illinois and New Jersey are
other States that reversed earlier
decisions that refused to allow or
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recognize the right to sue fOJ
i:njuries. 4 1
A 1955 decision from the
Appeals in Kentucky under
emphasized the legal person
fetus within the terms of
statute precisely because it was
considered biologically to b, 1 person:
"The most cogent reason, we
holding that a viable unborn
entity within the meaning of
word person is because, biolo1
ing such a child is, in fact ,
existing person, a living human

There are presently tl
Rhode Island, Alabaina ali
- that have not had the c
to reverse their standin'
simply because no cases
have been filed recently . I:
a ruling in 1960 that ,
case , Michigan will allo w

states Michigan
·. portunity
decisions
recovery
,s clear by
. the next
,~

~ covery .

we know makes it possible to
clearly that separability begins
The mother's bilogical
from conception on is
and protection, but. the fetus
separate organism and remains
;uu:ouigh<mt life. That it may not live if its
and nourishment are cut off
the viable stage .... is not to
septar~tbillity; it is rather to describe
under which life will not

reason of recent development in
science of embryology , whereby
life is considered to be present
the moment of conception , the
can recognize the pre-viable fetus
a person and vest it with rights,
ly the right, if born, to sue in
own name or by next friend for
sustained before it reached
or, if it dies before birth, the
of beneficiarie-s to bring action
the wrongful death statute.

43

Some states - Nebrash
and Alaska - by reasc
reasoning in recent dec.
doubt as· to what posi'
taken in subsequent petih·
Clearly the majority oi .urisdictions
recognize the right of a ·i1.ild to _sue,
after his birth, for dama: t:s sustamed
while a viable fetus.
In 1953, there was a departure frorn
the viability requirement. In the Kell~
v. Gregory ca&e , the pl<i intiff alleg;d
that he was injured du ~ .ng the thIn
month of his mother' s pregnancy. e
. h.1m, as b orn , ti1c'
grantmg
1..; rt'ght to su
.
for recovery for such inju ry • Justu::e
Bergan declared:
.
h thete
"Legal separability shOuld_?,~gtn w ere Jcnof
is biological separabuny . We ss of

something more of the actual proce thaD
conception and fetal development n~;cided;
when the common law cases were

subsequent birth was verified,
states have already accorded
right to bring action .for injuries
·
by the non-viable fetus. 4 6
University of Pennsylvania Law
notes:

in the pre-viable state , the mother was
about three and a half months
pregnant when she was involved in an
accident , which was allegedly caused
by the defendant's negligence and the
injuries .resulted in a premature birth
and the prematurity brought on death.
The child lived about two and one-half
hours after birth. The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts held that the
intestate was a person within the
understanding of the Wrongful Death
Act and the administrator of his estate
could bring action for his death. The
decision declares:
" In the case at bar, where the fetus was not
viable, we must decide whether there is a
sound distinction from the situation where
the fetus is viable. . . . . In the vast
majority ofcases where the present issue has
arisen recovery has been
allowed. . . . . There is no longer lack of
precedent. The advancement of medical
science should take care of most of these
arguments (i.e. against recovery) . The
element of speculation is not present to any
greater extent than in the usual tort claim
where medical evidence is offered and the
issue of causation must be weighed with
great care. . . . . We are not impressed with
the soundness of the arguments against
recovery. They should not prevail against
logic and justice. We hold that the plaintiff's
intestate was a person. " 4 8

injustice of excluding actions by
fetuSes becomes manifest when it
that the results of the negligent
conduct are precisely the same
the fetus was viable or not. Perhaps
onsideration alone would have
ind'uced most courts to drop the
. But that development has
by increasing awareness that
viability is highly relative,
its application on a multitude
facts in different situations.
is not only unjust but
. . ... There is little doubt
trend will continue, and that the
someday make no distinction as to
SUS>taiJrted in the previable stage as a
~ cause of action for prenatal

Two courts have recognized the right
. to recover for injuries sustained in the
very first month of pregnancy - I'llinois
and Pennsylvania. 50 Georgia has accorded the right with reference to
injuries in the second month of
pregnancy .5 1

most recent case decided in
of recovery for injuries received

A further reason to justify actions
for injuries sustained in the pre-viable

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has held that "medical authorities have
long since recognized that a child is in
existence from the moment of
conception.'' 4 9
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period is the consideration that recent
medical findings indicate that much
damage is done to the fetus in the first
trimester of pregnancy.
"Indeed .... . there is .substantial
medical authority· which indicates that
congenital · structural defects
occasioned by environmental factors
can be sustained only within the
earliest stages of the previable period.
Judicial disallowance . of actions for
injuries to nonviable fetuses may well
be a denial of the most meritorious
claims. " 5 2
By reason of the above evidence, it
is abundantly · clear that the greater
number of Courts recognize the legal
personality of the viable fetus and the
definite tendency for the future is to
abandon completely the arbitrary
distinction between non-viability and
.viability and thereby recognize the
legal personality of the non-viable or
pre-viable fetus and accord the right,
after birth, to bring action for injuries
sustained in the first twenty-six weeks
of intrauterine life.

approach but the law cannot a.lways
follow or be based upon pure l g.Ic.
There are many factors to be
considered in the cases of st. 1borns,
e.g., what is the .real basis of T 'e right
to recover? Is recovery of b· ,efit to
the dead child or merely com1, nsation
to the parents for their sm )w and
loss? How are the legal derivat ons and
analogies to be applied? Is rt .overy a
compensatory mechanism o , merely
punitive action for negligent Jnduct?
Is natural justice involved n these
death actiQns, whereby then. must be
found a legal right for every · . rong or
injury? Is factual birth that j: 1portant
a happening that its abs/ 1ce can
restrict or deny the right of : :covery?

However these question~ may be
answered, it would appear that, as
regards the right to recove · when a
fetus is stillborn, there t ·nnot or
should not be any distinc· ·~m as to
whether the death occum. -~ in the
viable or non-viable states. · '; iowever,
the justification used in th pren~tal
injury cases would seen equally
applicable here, no matter ·.v~a~ type
The above rights and actions are,
of death statute is involved. l ~ ISJUSt as
however, predicated upon and limited
illogical to permit recovery for. the
by the subsequent live birth of the
estates of viable fetus and to deny It to
child. If the child is born alive and · those of nonviable fetuse s; the loss to
even if it survives only a matter of a
. t he same. ,5 3
the pare~ts IS
few minutes or a few hours, the right
to sue for prenatal injury is
The same author notes:
recognized. What about the fetus who
..On the basis of legislative intcr1t, ho~ever,
is not born alive; the fetus who dies in
limiting recovery ·to surviving mf~t~ IS .no
the uterus by reason of the very
more justi.f:table than a similar distinction
injuries sustained? Is there a right to
between viable -and ~on~~ble fetu:
Moreover, in a death action It ~s the parethe
his parents, to his beneficiaries to
recover or to be compensated for his , that are claiming compensation, not ·zed
fetus. As long as the p~ents ru:e recoglll of
death?
to have a compensable mterest m the casethe

The first reaction might be that if a
child, when born, can sue for injury,
certainly parents should be able to
initiate action for his death, since
death is a greater evil than injury. This
would definitely be the logical

204

death caused by prenatal injuries whe~
0
fetus initially survives birth, there ISd ~
reason why recovery should be de~ebOtb
stillborn cases. The essential in terest 1Jl nts.
situations is the expectation of the par~ i~
In those cases where recovery is allow.e ~
in effect compensates for emotional dis.~,;.
'
·
of 11""
resulting
from frustr a tion

',

ion. . . . . The absurdity of
the line of liability at survival is
illustrated by the recent action of
bJIISY.f1VanJia court *n granting letters of
•utr:aticm to the estates of two of a set
while denying them as to the
three were allegedly killed by
injuries sustained in ari automobile
but while two survived birth for a
minutes, the third was stillborn." 54

essential difference between the
at law if the fetus is born alive
stillborn is that, in the case of a
birth, even though death ensues
immediately, there is an action
survives the death and that can be
in the name· of the deceased
the one .who administers his estate;
if the fetus is stillborn, the
brought by parents or
in their own name for
for their loss without
reference ta the rights of the

attack the requirement of live birth is,
speaking, to abandon an interest
and to embrace a policy that
that the beneficiaries of a stillborn
ought to recover under the Wrongful
Statutes. " 55

•

• (
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Gordon, reflecting on this problem
of compensation, declares:
"Although it is true · that parents have been
able to recover substantially for the loss of a
minor child, the grant of compensation to
the Qeneficiaries of such a minor, and a
fortiori to the parents of an infant in utero,
is in reality compensation for sentimental
loss framed as though it were pecuniary loss.
The award is pure speculation . . . . . A
fundamental basis of tort law is the
provision of compensation to an innocent
plaintiff for the loss that he has suffered.
Tort law is not, as a general nlle, premised
upon punishing the wrongdoer. It is not
submitted that the tortious destroyer of a
child in utero should be able to escape
completely by killing instead of merely
maiming. But . it is submitted th~t to
compensate the parents any further than
they are entitled by well-settled principles
of law and to give them a windfall through
the estate of the fetus is blatant
pUnishment. The actual - pecuniary - loss
basis of compensation in wrongful death
- actions has, where the award will be based .
on speculation, given way in some states to
a fixed sum of money. It has been suggested
that the same principles be adopted in the
unborn plaintiff class of case.,

this

It would appear that the entire
matter of wrongful death actions can
be considered from the point of view
of the basis or the right ·to bring an
action. Gordon claims that there are
three bases - causative, legal and
biological.

most states have compensatory
death statutes - that is, the
recovery is limited to the amount
-.cease~ person could reasonably have
expected to contribute to the person
- such an action is usually worth no
than nominal damages. Future income
born dead had he lived is certainly
and the expenses of raising the
Would definitely be great, so financial

The causative approach completely
. ignores the fetus and his right.s and
considers merely the causal
relationship between the negligent
conduct or action of a possible
defendant and the irijury sustain·ed. In
this analysis, birth is the donor of the
right to sue and, in the eventuality of a
stillborn, there could not be any
action.

himself to

..... ':

loss usually cannot be proved. If the amount
recoverable under the wrongful death
statute is proportional to the fault of the
defendant, then a suit on behalf of a baby
born dead is meaningful." 56·
'
.·

I
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The legal approach is based upon an
advantage to be gained by the plaintiff
- what is to his benefit. If a fetus dies,
he can derive no advantage or benefit
by bringing a tort action - the benefit
would be to .his 'beneficiaries - and,
thus, no action would be allowed.
The biological approach depends
upon the concept of life, which
becomes the grantor of rights and
wherever there is ·life, there is a right
to sue for the extinction of that life.
According to modern scientific
investigation, this life begins . at
conception. Since life and not birth is
the basis of the right to sue, in the
event of a stillbirth, a wrongful death
action could be accorded. 5 8

right to sue, have recogni . ~ d and
entertained actions of recovr y with
reference to stillborns. 6 1
Tennessee, South C rolina,
Massachusetts and Alaska Co . rts have
declared that live birth cr< ,tes the
fullness of the legal personalit , which,
in turn, grants the right t f sue for
recov~ry for injuries sustain< -; during
intrauterine life. Thus, no a ion can
be filed on behalf of a ch].. who is
born dead. 62

Without considering tht= possible
pre-natal injuries and condi1 ms that
coul<l beset· a fetus or withu t delving
into the matter of negliges, ·e or the
proof of negligence, - s1 ce these
matters would be outside tl scope of
this paper - it is advisab · , at this
Despite the above-mentioned
juncture~ to mention that t ; -~ right to
difficulties surrounding suits, entered
enter an action might be : cognized
on behalf of stillborns, some courts
and allowed but a verdic': favoring
have recognized the right to sue and
actual recovery cannot and . .rill not be
have entertained such suits.
entered until there is legally •.;:;ceptable
The first case in the United States
proof that the fetus was iL, ured and
was heard in the State of Minnesota in
that the negligent act of ow , who had
1949 - Verkennes v. Corniea. The
a duty towards the fetus was the
mother had suffered a rupture of the
cause of the injury and, in i l;e event of
uterus during labor and both she and
a subsequent death, that ·he injury
the child died. A suit was filed on
was the cause of death. I !1 short, it
behalf of the deceased alleging · must be established that thf defendant
negligence a~ainst the attending
had a responsibility towards the fetus
physician and the hospital. 59 In 1954,
and that there existed a d ~'ect causal
a case was returned by the court of
connection between hi~ allegedly
last appeal in Mississippi to the trial
wanton and negligent act, the injury
court so that arguments on the
and the subsequent death.
question of negligence could be
weighed by the jury, since a directed
Under the · restri cti ns and
verdict had been given in the original
limitations set forth above, the
trial. This was also a malpractice suit
American Jurisprudence does grant the
right to sue for prenatal injuries to 3
and the return to the trial court, for
the consideration of negligence, clearly
fetus during its intrauterine life - eve~
though, in the opinion of some, thiS
implied that the deceased child had
right may not be exercised until after
the right to bring the action. 6 0
live birth - since the law vests rights
Many states, in recent times, basing. only in persons, the law, therefore,
recognizes the non-viable and the
their findings on the principle that life
viable fetus as a legal person .
- ·and not birth - is the donor of the
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should be recalled that some
have recognized and granted the
· to bring suit on behalf of a fetus
was never born alive.
'
proponents of liberal abortion
the position that, because some
have insisted on a live birth
an action could be instituted
fa·ct seriously limits or diminishe~
right of the fetus - even to the
of inferring that there is no right
there is a birth. ·
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